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RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: AN OVERVIEW 
 




The paper seeks to present an in depth overview of rural financial markets in developing 
countries. Attention is given to the role of financial markets in the development process, 
approaches to rural finance in developing countries, and formal and informal financial markets. 
The pro and cons of the various financial markets were also considered. 
 
SAMEVATTING : LANDELIKE FINANSIËLE MARKTE : 'N OORSIG 
 
In hierdie artikel word gepoog om 'n diepte-oorsig te gee van landelike finansiële markte in 
ontwikkelende lande. Aandag word gegee aan die rol van finansiële markte in die 
ontwikkelingsproses, benaderings tot landelike finansiering in ontwikkelende lande asook aan 
formele en informele finansiële markte. Die voor- en nadele van die verskillende finansiële 




Rural financial markets in developing countries should be seen as a system 
comprising of formal and informal sectors. In the formal sector, banks, credit 
cooperatives and public sector organisations provide intermediation between 
borrowers and depositors or borrowers and the government. The institutional 
providers of financial services are many and varied, including public and 
private; regulated and unregulated firms; those primarily providing short-term 
debt capital and those providing equity capital. In the informal sector, private 
individuals provide credit largely out of their own equity. The informal sector 
usually has three facets: 
 
(1)  Commercial moneylending by farmers, traders, pawnbrokers, salaried 
employees or professional moneylenders; 
 
(2)  arrangements between friends, relatives, and neighbours, often at zero 
interest rates and  
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(3)  the activities of self-help organisations, such as  rotating savings and 
credit associations (Hoff & Stiglitz, 1992). 
The availability of affordable financial capital has long been recognised as an 
important factor in economic development, in addition to other factors, which 
Mosher (1971) referred to as "the element of a progressive rural structure". Rural 
financial markets have been at the centre of policy interventions in developing 
countries over the past four decades. Many governments, supported by 
multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, have devoted considerable resources to 
supply cheap credit to farmers in a myriad of institutional settings (Hoff & 
Stiglitz, 1990). This emphasis on credit need has not been free of problems. Many 
of these programmes have required large subsidies and loan recovery has often 
been disappointing. The rural poor have had difficulty in getting access to these 
cheap loans, and it is not clear that large increases in formal lending have 
accelerated development. Even more importantly, many of the financial 
intermediaries conducting these programmes are not self-sustaining (Adams & 
Meyer, 1989).  
 
2.  ROLE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
Patrick (1966) maintains that in developing countries, an efficient system of 
financial intermediaries is a necessary and sufficient condition for the growth of 
various financial assets and liabilities and for economic development. According 
to Gonzalez-Vega (1989), financial markets contribute to economic development 
in the following ways: 
 
First, the financial system contributes to economic development to the extent to 
which it provides access to a wide range of financial services for a wide range of 
the population. This contribution rests on the provision of a growing range of 
services, including loans for different purposes as well as deposit facilities, 
mechanisms for the transfer of funds, and currency exchanges, as well as other 
specialised services once the market size grows sufficiently. 
 
Second, the financial system transfers growing volumes of purchasing power 
from depositors with limited deposit opportunities to borrowers with better 
productive options. The contribution of financial intermediation to economic 
development precisely consists of the transfer of resources from less productive 
uses to activities where they can be more profitably employed. In this way, 
deposits substitute for less attractive uses of the funds, while loans make better 
uses possible. The productivity of resources is thus improved. 
 
Third, the financial system should offer high quality financial services. A farmer 




wants the funds to be timeously disbursed, the loan procedure to be easy and 
flexible, the amortisation schedule to correspond adequately to his cash flow, 
and the loan period to be sufficiently long. All these features determine quality 
of service. 
 
Fourth, the financial system contributes to economic development when it offers 
low cost services. This does not necessary  mean low interest rates, but rather 
low transaction costs. A financial system that mobilises savings, allocates capital, 
manages risk, eases transactions, and monitors farmers and firms is essential for 
economic growth and development. 
 
3.  APPROACHES TO RURAL FINANCE IN AFRICA 
 
There are two schools of thought on the promotion of financial markets, namely, 
the traditional or conventional project view and the market performance view 
(Graham, 1992). 
 
3.1  The traditional/conventional project view 
 
Assumptions underlying the traditional or conventional project view can be 
grouped into two main categories. 
 
(1)  Saver-borrower behaviour - the common assumptions are that the rural 
poor cannot save and will therefore not respond to incentives or 
opportunities to save, that most farmers need cheap loans and supervision 
before they will adopt new technologies and make major farm 
investments, and that loans in kind are used in the form granted. 
 
(2)  Lender behaviour - the common assumptions are that most informal 
lenders are exploitative and charge such rates of interest that result in 
large monopoly profits, that the rural poor do not receive formal loans 
because formal lenders are overly risk averse, that nationalised lenders 
can be forced to ignore their own profits and losses to service risky 
customers and the rural poor, and that all formal lenders can be induced 
to follow government regulations in allocating services (Adams & 
Graham, 1981). 
 
Criteria used to allocate credit critically affect the performance of credit 
programmes. Such criteria include (inter alia) credit needs, credit demand and 
the easing of credit constraints. These criteria ignore the subtleties of risk and 
confidence and deny the possibility that there may be alternative ways to 




clear that equating credit with need, demand or easing credit constraints easily 
overstates the role of credit (Von Pischke, 1991). 
 
The traditional strategies commonly used by government and development 
assistance institutions to achieve their objectives at the frontier are flawed 
mainly in the following respects (Von Pischke, 1991): 
 
(1)  Overemphasis of credit : Even though this could be adopted as 
developmental strategy, it has its limitations. Von Pischke (1991) 
mentioned three weaknesses : it does not produce good loans and is 
therefore ultimately unsustainable; it ignores savings mobilisation and 
therefore retards intermediation; it disregards alternative means of 
stimulating investments and therefore tends to be both inefficient and 
inequitable. The design of the traditional agricultural credit programmes 
was characterised by borrower domination. All practices and operational 
procedures were designed to promote the interest of the borrower in 
mind while the interest of the depositor or of the institution was itself 
largely disregarded. Borrower-dominated institutions have also been 
characterised by the absence of a clear concept of risk in their operation 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1989). 
 
(2)  Use of targets and credit quotas or ceilings : governments use lending 
targets and credit quotas to push lenders through the frontier at a faster 
pace than they would otherwise undertake (Von Pischke, 1991). 
Governments influence lender behaviour. The techniques used to target 
loans through regulations can be grouped into five categories - loan 
portfolio requirements, rediscount facilities, crop or loan insurance, 
regulation on bank branching and nationalisation of banks. (Adams & 
Vogel, 1984; Johnson, 1974; Fry, 1988). These instruments have a number 
of shortcomings. They do not generate good loans and they tend to 
weaken controlled lenders because the approach does not address the 
problems that make lenders reluctant to advance the frontier voluntarily, 
in that they are usually designed without reference to the cost of their 
implementation (Von Pischke, 1991). 
 
  Credit ceilings reduce efficiency in two ways. First, they limit all banks 
equally, even those that are more efficient at lending or those that have the 
most dynamic entrepreneurs as their clients. Hence credit ceilings impose 
an uneven rationing criterion because of the customer-market nature of 
bank credit. Second, credit ceilings reduce efficiency by destroying 
competition for deposits. Once the ceiling is reached, extra deposits 




efforts to attract deposits and to provide good services to existing 
depositors. Alternatively, they may reduce deposit rates of interest. The 
overall effect of credit ceilings is to increase the spread between gross cost 
of borrowing and net returns to lenders. Indeed, credit ceilings 
deliberately reduce financial intermediation (Fry, 1988). 
 
  The fungibility of funds has frustrated attempts to control the marginal 
use of resources, while rationing, needed in view of excess demand, and 
excessive supervision have both increased transaction costs for the banks 
as well as for the borrowers. These implicit costs have been especially high 
in the case of small loans. Rigid credit programming, while usually 
fruitless, has thus been expensive for all (Gonzalez-Vega, 1989). 
 
(3)  Neglected transaction costs : government policies, presumably intended 
to benefit individual farmers and firms, paradoxically tend to increase 
loan applicants' and depositors' transaction costs. Lenders who face an 
onslaught of questionable applicants, attempt to control costs by the 
imposition of transaction costs in the form of opportunity cost of time. 
This is accomplished by demanding lots of documents to support an 
application; by restricting service, which requires applicants to queue; and 
by soliciting bribes. Some researchers mention that, of course, the ultimate 
weapon against a loan applicant is to lose the file containing the 
application and accompanying documents, which occurs occasionally 
when lenders find the going extremely rough. The transaction costs 
imposed on depositors are similar to those imposed on the borrowers by 
intermediaries who are not anxious to seek new clients at the frontier. The 
transaction costs tend to be high when the financial institutions do not 
depend upon deposits as important sources of funds. These approaches 
constitute a real cost to society. According to Von Pischke (1991) increases 
in transaction costs tend to make borrowers' and depositors' cost of funds 
roughly equal to the cost of alternative funds/savings that they could 
obtain/deposit elsewhere. 
 
(4)  Overlooked incentives : most credit programmes tend to disregard 
incentives that motivate individuals and institutions. According to Von 
Pischke (1991) this results in failure to address the role of confidence in 
financial relationships. Confidence in finance is built only when both 
parties to a transaction or relationship have incentives to consider the 
interest of the other party or to behave as if they did.  
 
(5)  Emphasis on institutions rather than instruments : governments and 




than in finance itself. They become involved with agricultural credit 
institutions, co-operative credit societies, small enterprise development 
funds, special credit programmes, among others, and they establish these 
at the expense of financial products or services which are the financial 
vehicles needed to ensure good transactions (Von Pischke, 1991). 
 
The Traditional/conventional credit view further exhibits the following features: 
 
(1)  In the design of specialised financial institutions the financial viability of 
these institutions is not regarded as a prime objective (Gonzalez-Vega, 
1989). Such schemes evaluate their performance according to the number 
of loans and speed with which they are disbursed to a targeted clientele, 
the amount of inputs financed and allocated within the project, the rate of 
technology adoption, and the increase in employment and output. Given 
the fungibility of finance, Graham (1992), pointed out that it is naive to 
assume that a substantial share of targeted credit is not diverted for other 
uses. It is also naive to associate increase in output with the increase in 
credit rather than with other factors; increased output has multiple causes 
(Graham, 1992). Credit needs are given precedence over creditworthiness 
or the debt-carrying capacity of the borrower. 
 
(2)  It is characterised by borrower domination. All practices and operational 
procedures are geared towards the interest of the borrower. The interest 
of the depositor or the institution itself receives little or no attention 
(Graham, 1992; Gonzalez-Vega, 1989). According to Gonzalez-Vega (1989) 
borrower dominated institutions have been characterised by the absence 
of a clear concept of risk in their operations. They have attempted to 
channel funds to target clientele, for specific purposes, rather than to 
evaluate the borrower's repayment capacity and the degree of risk taken 
in each case. 
 
(3)  Traditional credit programmes have mistrusted the market and have 
minimised the role of interest rates as a major instrument of resource 
allocation (Gonzalez-Vega, 1989). Thinking in these programmes has been 
dominated by the notion that it is appropriate to extend agricultural loans 
at low interest rates in order to promote agricultural development and to 
assist the rural poor. (Donald, 1976 ; Adams & Graham, 1981). Rates of 
interest on agricultural loans may even in nominal terms be as low as zero 
and do not often exceed 12% per year in most low income countries 
(World Bank, 1975). Interest rates assigned to savings are simultaneously 
less than the concessionary rates charged on loans. 




(4)  Rural finance projects in low income countries (LICs) have stressed low 
interest loans for agriculture and have neglected savings mobilisation, the 
other half of rural finance (Adams & Vogel, 1984; Gonzalez-Vega, 1989). 
 
(5)  Most of these supply-led credit programmes and their specialised 
institutions have not been financially v i a b l e  b e c a u s e  o f  h i g h  o v e r h e a d  
costs and low loan recovery. According to Graham (1992), their 
transaction costs have been greatly underestimated, and in many cases 
they have collapsed into expensive, one-shot, income-transfer schemes to 
the non-poor. Both borrowers and savers incur transaction costs, 
monetary as well as non-monetary, which can be several times the interest 
paid on loans (Adams & Vogel, 1984). 
 
In summary, policies and programmes directed along the conventional wisdom 
held under the traditional view have resulted in high delinquency and default 
rates (Boakye-Dankwa, 1979; Sandertne, 1978), thereby reducing the lending 
capacities of many financial institutions. The criteria used in these programmes 
have not necessarily been compatible with the institutions' survival (Gonzalez-
Vega, 1989). These developments have led to increasing criticisms among 
observers and researchers concerning the formal rural financial markets (Von 
Pischke, 1978; Lipton, 1976; Gonzalez-Vega, 1989). 
 
3.2  The market performance view 
 
The deficiencies in and the results of programmes conducted according to the 
traditional vision have led to a change of approach in the analysis and 
promotion of rural financial markets (Gonzalez-Vega, 1989). The alternative 
approach has been labelled "the market performance view"(Graham, 1992). This 
new approach operates on a different set of criteria. 
 
In contrast to the traditional credit view, the market performance view regards 
good loan recovery, low transaction costs in lending and deposit mobilisation, 
increases in the number of people with ready access to financial services ( both 
loans and deposits) and the proportion of total funding that comes from locally 
mobilised deposits as its main criteria of success (Graham, 1992). Its main 
characteristics are as follows: 
 
(1)  The market performance view emphasises the mobilisation of domestic 
deposits and savings as a strategic ingredient in any recipe for building 
healthy financial institutions (Graham, 1992). It regards local deposit 
mobilisation as a powerful tool of ensuring viability of financial 




resources for self-finance on the one hand and on-lending on the other 
hand. Moreover, savings schemes can serve more rural households than 
credit ever will (Adams & Vogel, 1985). Saving mobilisation involves the 
rural community in financial operations and simultaneously educates 
them in the sense that local savings provide the resources for lending 
activities (IFAD, 1988). 
 
  Smoothly and competitively functioning savings and lending institutions 
ultimately reduce the interest rate spread between savings and loans. The 
rate paid on deposits rises and the lending rate decreases. Thus, the 
propensity to substitute consumption and in-kind savings for financial 
deposits decreases (Schrieder & Heidhues, 1991). 
 
(2)  The market performance approach views the identification of expected 
real rate of interest as well as unsubsidized interest rate as major 
determinants of borrower, saver, and lender behaviour. Real rates are 
thought to strongly influence the overall performance of the financial 
markets (Adams, 1978; Gonzalez-Vega, 1989; Vogel, 1979). Subsidised 
lending rates have no place in this school of thought. 
 
(3)  Thirdly, the approach emphasises the reduction of transaction costs and 
the use of cost-and risk-reducing financial innovations as means to 
support a sustainable flow of untargeted financial services (Graham, 
1992). 
 
(4)  Other tenets of this view include the recognition of the importance of the 
informal financial markets (Adams & Graham, 1981; Begashaw, 1978). It 
argues against packaging loans and the use of other similar non-market 
rationing devices, since these diminish the most attractive and useful 
property of finance, namely fungibility (Von Pischke & Adams, 1980). 
Examples of such undesired devices are the allocation of loans in fixed 
quotas, loans in kind or efforts to specify the ultimate use of a loan. 
 
In conclusion, this approach predicates a system in which numerous and diverse 
market participants are linked through flows of funds and of information. Thus, 
economic agents who borrow in one segment, lend in another and thereby 
reduce transaction costs, ensuring viability of the financial institution and 
protection of the depositor. 
 
However, it must be pointed out that with all these virtues, there are also some 
limitations to this approach. In its strictest form, very few loans go beyond the 




some reasonable compromise between the default-ridden, borrower-dominated 
development bank model, which has collapsed into bankruptcy in practically all 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa on one hand and the extremely risk-averse, 
saver-dominated private bank model on the other. Some balance of risk and 
returns is required to arrive at a compromise. 
4.  INFORMAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
Indigenous, informal or unlegislated financial institutions abound throughout 
the developing countries. However, they do take different forms and perform 
different functions in different parts of the World. In Asia, indigenous financial 
institutions such as the curb market in Korea, the finance companies in India, 
and chit funds in Thailand tend to engage in a considerable volume of business 
and trade finance for even large-scale enterprise. In Africa, the predominant 
form of indigenous financial institutions is the rotating savings and credit 
associations, called ekub in Ethiopia, djanggi in Cameroon, tontine in Benin, 
chilemba in Malawi, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, susu/esusu from Zaire to 
Liberia (Fry 1988), and stokvels in South Africa (Lukhele, 1990). 
 
For more than two decades, policy makers endeavoured to promote formal 
financial markets in their attempts to direct more credit into rural areas in 
pursuit of production and income goals. Informal financiers, especially 
moneylenders, have often been considered to be exploitative and a hindrance to 
modernising agriculture. Policies have often been employed with an explicit 
objective of increasing formal finance and diminishing the role of the informal 
financier (Meyer & Nagarajan, 1992). The poor performance of the formal 
finance sector in some areas - ironically, areas where formal finance temporarily 
displaced informal finance - caused the informal sector to re-emerge as the main 
source of financial services for most rural firms and households. Heidhues (1985) 
estimated informal finance to constitute over two-thirds of all agricultural credit 
in Africa. 
 
Informal finance includes a heterogeneous set of individual and group financial 
arrangements. Most fall outside the scope of government support and 
regulation, although some countries have usury and other laws intended to 
cover them. Some types of informal institutions are autonomous, while others 
emerge as a reaction to the repression of formal finance (Chandavarkar, 1986). 
S o m e  h a v e  s t r o n g  l i n k s  t o  f o r m a l  f i nance such as the input supplier who 
borrows from formal institutions and sells inputs on credit, while others operate 
completely outside the formal system. 
 
4.1 Traditional  views 




The informal financial sector has for decades been subjected to criticism. Critics 
including poets, prophets, playwrights and politicians, have claimed that its 
performance is bad or insufficient in virtually all respects (Holst, 1985). Others 
have pointed accusing fingers at informal lenders and have questioned the 
comfort of their after-life (Adams, 1992). According to Adams (1992) pejorative 
and emotive terms such as monopolist, usurer, shylock, loan shark and exploiter 
have been used for informal financial lenders. 
 
Other terms used to describe informal finance in the past were unorganised, and 
non-institutional. Over time, however, the term informal have replaced these 
earlier terms. Tun Wai (1992) pointed out that research has increasingly shown 
that many forms of informal finance are well organised and that some of these 
forms are deeply entrenched social institutions. 
 
Informal finance has, in the past, been regarded as rural related. Again, research 
have disproven this thought. It increasingly appears that informal financial 
arrangements can be found almost everywhere - including urban areas - where 
there are market transactions and cash income. It occurs among and between all 
economic classes - it is not just rich individuals lending to poor people (Tun Wai, 
1992). It is used by the rich and the poor but often it is the only source for the 
poor, while it is an alternative source for the rich (Meyer & Nagarajan, 1992). In 
recent years, an increasing number of experts have began to evaluate the costs 
and benefits of informal financial institutions in a more objective manner in 
terms of responsiveness to the needs of savers and borrowers, economic 
efficiency, use of market power in setting interest rates and the allocation of 
resources (Holst, 1985). 
 
4.2  Attributes of informal finance 
 
Meyer and Nagarajan (1992) list several attributes of informal finance: 
 
1)  Heterogeneity - informal finance includes a wide variety of institutional 
forms and a variety of financial contracts between savers and borrowers 
can be found within any one type. Informal financial institutions are used 
almost exclusively to finance household consumption, investment or very 
small-scale business enterprises (Fry, 1988). Informal finance offers both 
loans and savings, unlike supply-lending finance institutions which often 
ignore savings. Many types of informal finance institutions also offer 
marketing and other services. 
 
2)  Specialisation - some informal financial arrangement serves a broad 




example, money keepers, moneylenders and trade lenders often provide 
only one type of financial service that is limited to those clients of whom 
the supplier has good information. 
 
3)  Collateral - very few loans involve collateral. However, in the extreme end 
collateral substitutes are used to enforce repayment in the informal credit 
market (Esguerra & Meyer, 1992). The informal financial sector has 
developed effective collateral substitutes through interlinked contracts, 
peer monitoring and group lending (Meyer & Nagarajan, 1992). Other 
forms of collateral substitutes used in some developing countries include -
:  
 
•  third party guarantees ("sureties") where the loan is given on the 
strength of a guarantee provided by a third person, usually someone 
with the means to pay the loan if the original borrower defaults, 
 
•  linked markets/contracts or tied contracts where the loan is given on 
the promise or agreement that the lender will be the sole buyer of the 
produce at a mutually acceptable implicit interest rate. The mortgaging 
of tenancy or cultivation rights which affords the mortgagee to derive 
actual and beneficial use of the land which yields him returns over and 
above the earnings derive from the principal, and  
 
•  threat of loss of future borrowing opportunities which for as long as it 
represents a credible threat is an effective means to keep the integrity 
of the loan contract (Llanto, 1990). 
 
4)  Interest rates and transaction costs - money lenders have often been 
criticised for charging exploitative interest rates on loans, but at the other 
edge of the scale, some other types of informal lenders, such as friends 
and relatives, often charge no interest at all. Fry (1988) pointed out that 
informal finance is characterised by higher lending rates than formal 
finance. However, non interest costs of borrowing from the banks are 
often substantial (e.g. transaction costs), whereas they are virtually non 
existent in informal financial markets. 
 
  The real issue of interest is rather:  Does the informal financial market 
increase overall efficiency in the rural economy? The desire to use it 
explicitly suggests that it facilitates both consumption and input use 
during the periods between planting and harvest. If for some reason the 
activity of trader-lenders who provide the funding during the interim 




level of consumption and production, and over the long term less wealth 
accumulation (Fry, 1988) - and hence, retrogression in rural environment. 
  
  Ahmed (1984) estimated the gross cost of borrowing from money lenders 
in rural Bangladesh to average 86% a year of the loan rates, while that of 
commercial banks averaged 108% per annum. It's study pointed at 
sizeable non interest costs of bank borrowing, including travel, 
entertainment, bribes and the opportunity cost of time involved in 
securing the loan. He provides an explanation on why delinquency and 
default rates are higher in formal than informal finance. In the case of 
formal finance, gross costs of bank borrowing drops sharply as the 
maturity of the loan increases, since a large proportion of the cost consists 
of front-end transaction cost. This creates  strong incentives to postpone 
repayment. In contrast, interest forms the bulk of the gross cost of 
informal borrowing and since the marginal cost of lengthening the 
maturity of a loan from the informal institutions is always positive in real 
terms, there is little or no incentive to postpone repayment unnecessarily. 
 
  What tends to distinguish informal finance is the relatively low 
transaction cost to savers and borrowers because of close proximity; a 
minimum of formal procedures (Meyer & Nagarajan, 1992); better 
knowledge concerning their clients (and thus, lower risk) on the part of 
lenders, and thus the minimum information costs; no regulation of 
interest rates and therefore an ability to adjust fully to market forces; 
informal finance is furthermore not subject to the reserve requirements 
that are imposed on formal institutions (Fry, 1988). 
 
  Whereas formal institutions may be subject to asymmetric information - 
which denies the rural borrower effective access to financial resources, - 
informal finance does not suffer from this problem to the same degree. 
Informal lenders are able to hurdle the information barrier in rural credit 
markets and to maintain low transaction costs which make their lending 
operations cost effective. The rural borrower and the informal lender 
literally know each other quite well; this enables the latter to form a more 
accurate probability distribution of the farmer's default propensity and to 
factor it into the loan contract. The information wedge can easily be 
eliminated because both transactions operate within the same socio-
cultural and economic milieu (Llanto, 1990). 
 
Notwithstanding all these desirable attributes, informal finance is however not 
able to sustain the credit needs of a growing rural economy and to intermediate 




suited for modernisation, they are unable to lend for assets and market-
purchased modern yield-increasing inputs. Hence the growth of informal 
lenders has been inelastic (Mellor, 1976). 
 
Informal lenders have not been able to mobilise financial deposits on a large 
scale because their deposit facilities are inadequate, unsafe, untrustworthy, or 
less remunerative (Von Pischke et al, 1983). The informal credit market is 




The following policies may be suggested in the light of this exploratory analysis: 
 
(1)  Appropriate policies should be effected to provide rural households with 
incentives to save and to make it possible to use these savings effectively 
to promote development, particularly of small businesses that are likely to 
be the most important sources of employment and growth of income in 
rural areas. Experience in Taiwan (Ong et al, 1976), suggest that two sets of 
incentives may play a prominent role in stimulating rural household 
savings. The first set includes price policies, new technology, marketing 
facilities, land tenure adjustments and public investment programs. The 
second set is the physical presence of savings institutions in most rural 
areas. These institutions may provide convenience, stability, liquidity, and 
the security necessary to attract savings. The establishment of rural and 
community banks may be supportive to the expansion of commercial 
banks. The strengthening of rural and community banks will be one way 
of reducing high transaction costs for lenders and borrowers and 
overcoming the collateral problem. Where permanent branches may not 
be feasible, mobile banks could be used. These banks should in turn 
embark on seminars, workshops, lecturers and symposia to mobilise rural 
households for increased capital accumulation through savings.  
 
(2)  The government should provide monetary policies that would stimulate 
voluntary savings instead of the involuntary savings policies adopted in 
some developing countries. Policies like concessionary interest rates, 
manipulation of product and input prices and foreign exchange 
regulations should be avoided. These policies have often resulted in rural 
low income and weak incentives for rural savings. Any policy which leads 
to large and unstable inflation rates invariably encourages unproductive 
savings in real goods. An effective monetary system is therefore needed to 
ensure that those who hold money will have its real value preserved. 




(3)  It is also vitally important to create or provide an enabling environment 
for the efficient operation of institutions at the interface of the formal and 
informal financial sectors, including rural and community banks, credit 
unions and stokvels. Legislation and regulation practices should be 
enacted in order to ensure clean and efficient markets.  
 
(4)  Interests rates should be allowed to be dictated by market forces. Low 
rates discourage savers by reducing the attractiveness of intermediated 
financial assets. Savers are then more likely to keep their savings in cash, 
to invest them in tangible assets (eg. cattle) or to engage in speculation. 
These alternatives tend to be less efficient economically, and may lead to 
problems of unsustainability, eg. when such conditions lead to 
overinvestment in livestock and overexploitation of natural resource base. 
This invariably deprives intermediaries of deposits from the community 
as a source of loanable funds (Von Pischke, 1991). Low rates therefore 
encourage financial institutions' increasing dependence on government 
subsidies. 
 
  Low interest rates also encourage the diversion of borrowed funds to 
consumption purposes. Diversion is more likely with richer farmers who 
are less likely to be subjected to the enforcement of requirements that 
loans be used only for designated purposes. Interest rate ceilings force 
intermediaries to ration borrowers. Increased collateral requirements and 
reallocation of transaction costs to borrowers are often used as substitute 
rationing mechanisms. Hence, a flexible interest rate policy which 
provides adequate positive real rates of interests on rural savings will be 
necessary to promote rural savings. Bhatt (1979) generally attributes 
fragmentation of capital markets in the low income economies to the 
interest rate policy pursued. It is therefore believed that with the positive 
real rates of interest policy, these imperfections would be removed and 
their saving and investments would increase. 
 
(5)  Again, credit ceilings reduce efficiency in two ways in the financial sector. 
First, they limit all banks equally, including those that are most efficient at 
lending and those that have the most dynamic entrepreneurs as their 
clients. Second, credit ceilings reduce efficiency by destroying competition 
for deposits. Once the ceilings are reached, extra deposits represent idle 
cash reserves. Banks stop making efforts to attract deposits and to provide 
good services to existing depositors (Fry, 1988).  
 
(6)  There is a need for innovative deposit schemes and policies to facilitate 




purpose, for example may be able to provide stronger incentives to the 
savers than do institutions which provide only saving facilities. Examples 
of such schemes are: 
•  the Farmer's Protection Deposit Scheme in India:  In times of dire necessity 
arising out of crop failure, the farmer is eligible for a loan equal to double the 
amount of deposits in his account. The deposit earns interest and the farmer 
obtains the loan at a concession rate of interest. Farmers are therefore induced 
to save in the form of a deposit if it is linked with borrowing at a time of crop 
failure (Bhatt, 1979), and 
 
•  the IFAD project in Ghana obliges smallholder farmers to have savings 
accounts before they qualify for subsequent credit. 
 
With these policies it is believed that it may be possible to strike a balance 
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